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Rationality and Theistic Belief
according to which one can know both paradigm beliefs and theis
tic beliefs might be made out.
Plantinga's account of warrant does not help the parity thesis
vis-a-vis justification. In the next chapter I consider a challenge to
Plantinga's claim that belief in God can be properly basic. It is
found unsuccessful, but the discussion leads to some further obser
vations and the development of a new parity thesis that does not
fall prey, I believe, to the background belief challenge.
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My focus has been to explain and analyze various versions of the
parity thesis. One goal in this chapter is to explore a challenge to
Plantinga's claim that theistic beliefs can be properly basic. In
Chapter 2 I explained Alston's response to a challenge relying on
the supposed lack of confirmation of theistic beliefs. In Chapter 4 I
used a similar challenge to refute PT AS· The challenge to Plan
tioga's position also rests on the notion of confirmation. The lesser
part of my purpose here is to show that Alston's reply to the con
firmation challenge is appropriately applied to the challenge to
Plantinga's position. The more important goal is to use the discus
sion of confirmation as a springboard to further observations. This
discussion enables me to develop, in the next chapter, a new parity
thesis that does not fall prey to the challenges brought against PTA
and PTPI· Thus, in Sections I and 2 I present what I call the "pre
dictive confirmation challenge" and show that it fails. Section 3
fulfills the other goal, that of making certain observations that feed
into my suggestion that a holistic approach is needed for the justi
fication of theistic belief.
I . The Predictive Confirmation Challenge
The challenge to Plantinga's parity thesis is brought by Richard
Grigg, who writes:
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Plantinga points out that a belief such as the one that I had breakfast
this morning is properly basic in certain circumstances, i.e., as long
as I have no reason for supposing that my memory is defective. But
note that we can trust beliefs such as . . . [the paradigm beliefs] not
only because we are unaware of defects in our experiential equip
ment but also because we constantly have outside sources for confir
mation of such beliefs. Indeed, is it not only through such outside
sources that we can become aware of a defect in our equipment? For
example, when I return home this evening, I will see some dirty
dishes sitting in my sink, one less egg in my refrigerator than was
there yesterday, etc. This is not to say that . . . ["I had breakfast this
morning"] is believed because of evidence. Rather, it is a basic belief
grounded immediately in my memory. But one of the reasons that I
can take such memory beliefs as properly basic is that my memory
is almost always subsequently confirmed by empirical evidence. But
this cannot be said for a belief about God, e. g., the belief that God
created the world.'

Grigg's argument, briefly stated, is that paradigm beliefs are
properly basic because of some type of confirmation they have,
whereas belief in God is not similarly confirmed. Since according
to PTPI paradigm beliefs and beliefs about God are both properly
basic, the lack of confirmation for beliefs about God proves the
thesis false. That Grigg's confirmation challenge to Plantinga is re
lated to the confirmation challenge to CP Alston considers is ob
vious. The deliverances of CP are said not to have the kinds of
confirmation that the deliverances of PP have, so, although PP's
results are justified, CP's are not. As we know, Alston argues that
the challenge is irrelevant to his claims. For the same reasons, the
challenge is irrelevant to Plantinga's claims.
Why should Grigg's disanalogy show that theistic beliefs are not
properly basic? Grigg's assumption seems to be that properly basic
beliefs are beliefs that are reliably produced by a mechanism or
practice that generates beliefs about objects that are regular in a
way that allows for predictions to be made about them. Thus, in
sofar as Grigg's challenge rests on the belief that confirmation is
necessary for reliability, his challenge falls prey to Alston's re
sponse to similar confirmation challenges. The nature of the confir
mation for which Grigg calls is not clear, however, and some clarir.

Richard Grigg, "Theism and Proper Basicality, " p. 126.
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fic�tory terminology and distinctions are in order. At one point
Gngg seems to call for the confirmation of beliefs, as when he sug
ge�ts that "I had breakfast this morning" is confirmed by there
hem� �irty dish:s i? the sink. At another point he seems to suggest
.
that It IS the rehabihty (where, I take it, "reliability" refers to the
tendency t� produce true beliefs) of the belief-generating practice
�?at stands m �eed of confirmation. Grigg says, for example, that
my memory IS almost always subsequently confirmed by empiri
cal evidence. " It is convenient to call the confirmation of a prac
tice's reliability the "validation" of a practice, reserving the term
"confirmation" for the confirmation of the truth of a belief Con
firming that a belief is in fact true, however, does not entail that it
is pro�erly basic. But one clear feature of properly basic beliefs,
accordmg to the challenge, is that their confirmation at least makes
it likely that they are true and thus, perhaps, if not inferred from
other beliefs, basic and properly so.
A second point is simply that not every properly basic belief is
confirmed, and thus confirmation of a given belief is not necessary
for its proper basicality. Two issues come to mind. First, some
beliefs, even when we try to confirm them, fail to be confirmed.
Ne�ertheless, it does not follow that such beliefs fail to be properly
basic. The memory belief that I took a walk by myself in the
woods yesterday may not be confirmed because no one else saw
me. My hiking boots show no evidence of the walk, I brought
back no evidence of the walk from the woods, and so on. So, even
though many memory beliefs are confirmed, some are not. Nev
ertheless, such beliefs do not fail to be properly basic, at least on
those grounds. The second issue deals with the simple fact that
many beliefs are not confirmed because we have neither the time
the interest, nor any special reason to do so. Generally speaking, I
�o not concern myself with the confirmation of my memory be
hefs unless there is some special reason to do so. I do not worry
about :vhether I ate breakfast this morning, unless, for example, I
am bemg asked by the physician just before she does surgery. If
my memory seems vague on the topic, I might then try to confirm
or disconfirm my memory belief. The failure of a given belief to be
co�firmed surely does not entail that the belief fails to be properly
basic.
Two morals should be drawn here. First, the concern ought to
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be not that each and every properly basic belief is confirmed but
that, when, in general, one attempts to confirm certain kinds of
belief, they are confirmed. There are, however, some exceptions to
the rule. This brings to focus the second moral, that attention
should be paid to the source of the belief to be confirmed-the
epistemic practice-rather than to the belief alone. This brings
Plantinga's and Alston's positions close together on the issues of
confirmation and reliability. Some important relationships seem to
hold between the confirmation of beliefs and the validation of the
practice that generates the beliefs. One of these relationships �ay
be, for example, that, since many beliefs generated by a gtven
practice are confirmed, the practice is validated. If this relationship'
were to hold, then it might be enough for defense of Plantinga's
theory against the confirmation challenge to show that, if the prac
tice from which a belief comes is validated as reliable, then any
belief generated by the practice, all other things being equal, can be
legitimately taken to be properly basic. Here we find a potential
explanation for the fact that we generally trust our beliefs even
though not every belief can nor should be confirmed. But, as Al
ston correctly notes, such an approach to showing a practice reli
able is epistemically circular. Thus, talk about validation on
Grigg's behalf is better recast in terms of the rationality of engag
ing in such practices. More on this below.
We cannot yet reply to the confirmation challenge. The nature
of confirmation and validation remains unclear. How exactly
are we to understand the challenge? We can take one clue from
W. V. 0. Quine, who has taught us well that beliefs do not face
the tribunal of experience alone. The web of our beliefs is complex
in many ways, not the least of which is the very detailed set of
confirming and disconfirming relationships that hold between one
and another belief (or sets of beliefs) and between beliefs and expe
rience. What I suggest here is that this web of belief and experience
provides various understandings of the nature of confirmation
from within, depending on the kind of belief one considers. To
develop this point, we can concentrate initially on beliefs and expe
riences having to do with the physical world, drawing out some
implications of Alston's suggestion about the practices he calls b�
sic. Recall that a basic practice is "one that constitutes our baste
access to its subject matter. [For example, ] we can learn about our
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physical environment only by perceiving it, by receiving reports of
the perceptions of others, and by carrying out inferences from
what we learn in these first two ways. We can not know anything
a priori about these matters, nor do we have any other sort of
experiential access to the physical world. "2 Alston's suggestion, in
part at least, is that any judgment about the truth or falsity of a
claim about the physical world (or the reliability or unreliability of
a practice giving us information about the world) must be made
within the epistemic practice that provides access to the physical
world. There are, to be sure, some overlapping situations. For ex
ample, memory might be partly but not wholly validated by what
we learn from perception (a second practice), even if the remaining
parts involve appeal to memory. But the basic point stands: we
think that paradigm beliefs have a link to something that makes
them likely to be true only because we accept (pragmatically) the
practices that generate them. It is only within the basic practices
that we discover the nature of the physical world that gives the
paradigm beliefs that confirming link. Alston goes further than this
with his doxastic practice approach when he suggests that we
should understand reliability through the notion of rationality.
Compatible with this position is the suggestion that, because of
the nature of the physical world and the epistemic practices we use
to form beliefs about it, we take confirmation to be predictive in a
certain way; we take it that, when we go about confirming the truth
of a certain belief, we ought to look to see if certain other things
are true. We expect certain features or facts about the world to
become apparent to us as we continue to use the epistemic practice
(and its many subpractices) that grants us access to the physical
world. If, for example, I want to confirm that I see a tree, I look
again or ask someone else to look. Similarly with nonperceptual
practices. If I believe that I ate breakfast (a memory belief) and I
wish to confirm it, I look to see if I left dirty dishes in the sink.
Since physical objects do not normally disappear from view with
out some reasonable explanation, and since my epistemic faculties
are operating normally (as far as I can tell from within the prac
tice), I fully expect to find my beliefs about the world confirmed
when I try to confirm them. Thus, as Alston suggests, PP is self2. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. I I7.
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supported; it is then prima facie rational to engage in PP and, fur
thermore, the rationality that attaches to engaging in PP extends
beyond the kind that comes from the trivially supported type of
self-support accruing to all epistemic practices.
2 . The Failure of the Predictive Confirmation

Challenge
Grigg's challenge, interpreted through the notion of basic pra�
tices, comes to the following. Although many of the paradigm
beliefs can be confirmed (and their corresponding practices vali
dated) in a predictive way, theistic beliefs and practices cannot.
Therefore, theistic beliefs cannot be properly basic. We have al
ready seen, in Chapters 2 and 3, that this kind of predictive confir
mation challenge fails, according to Alston, because of irrelevance.
Alston's response to the fact that CP lacks confirmation whereas
PP does not is that the perceptual world is regular, and on the basis
of this regularity we can confirm and disconfirm our beliefs. The
physical world and our access to it are predictable simply because
the things about which we are seeking confirmation are regular
and predictable. We do not, however, find the regularities in our
access to God or his activities that we find in perceptual or mem
ory experiences. The regularities in religious experience are absent
not because of any fault in our epistemic faculties but because the
object about which we seek information is not regular or predict
able; God is not predictable. We can say, in summary, that theistic
beliefs are not confirmed and the practice by which theistic beliefs
are formed is not validated-not nontrivially self-supported-sim
ply because the attempts at validation and confirmation depend on
the regularity of the objects that the beliefs are purportedly
about.
This much we saw in Chapters 2 and 3. But the additional, posi
tive claim Alston makes, which I have mentioned before but only
briefly, is that if the confirming features were true of CP they
would tend to show CP unreliable. Alston writes: "The reality CP
claims to put us in touch with is conceived to be vastly different
from the physical environment. Why should not the sorts of pro
cedures required to put us in effective cognitive touch with this
reality be equally different? Why suppose that the distinctive fea
tures of PP set an appropriate standard for the cognitive approach
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to God?"3 In other words, our access to God and information
about him is different in an important way from our access to per
ceptual objects. The object of the former lacks the regularity of the
object of the latter. Whereas the breakfast dishes I put in the sink
remain there, enabling me to perceive them (ceteris paribus) when
I try to, God does not act in this predictable fashion. 4 We do not
even know which features of things, if any, God typically uses to
reveal himself. For all we know, there is no typical revelation of
God. But there is an explanation for this lack of regularity: God's
revelation of himself is not confined by the regularities of the natu
ral order. The lack of regularity in our experience of God, then, is
no reason to reject the reliability of the practice by which we some
times form beliefs about him or his activities. In fact, if some of the
things Christian's believe about God are true, then not only is pre
dictive confirmation not necessary for the trustworthiness of the
practice of forming theistic beliefs, but if we did discover great
regularity in God's dealings with us we would have reason to dis
trust the deliverances of the practice.
Simply stated, then, the Alstonian reply is that the predictive
confirmation challenge is irrelevant. An account of confirmation
internal to one kind of practice cannot be relevantly applied to an
other kind of practice. That theistic belief-forming practices do
have predictive confirmation available for their deliverances should
be no surprise. Let us consider an example that illustrates the reluc
tance of theists themselves to appeal to predictive confirmation.
The prayer of a Christian student that he score well on the medical
school entrance examinations may not be answered affirmatively.
Thus, a belief formed in the context of the prayer, for example,
"God will help me do well on the exams, " would remain uncon
firmed. In this case it is not that one cannot imagine what will
confirm the belief but rather that one receives more or less direct
disconfirmation. This in itself is not a problem for the notion of
predictive confirmation of theistic beliefs, but it does point in the
general direction of a rather telling fact about the way theists deal
with confirmation. Many Christian theists specifically make al3 . Ibid. , p. 128.
4· There may be an object of the belief that remains regular. For example, in a
case in which "God created the flower" is taken to confirm that " God created the
world, " the flower is regular (parallel to the dishes) although God is not. On the
analysis supplied, however, the latter irregularity is the real issue.
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lowances for "unanswered" prayer. Hence they would admit that
prayer-related beliefs such as "God will help me to score well on
the examinations" often fall into one of two categories. They are
either forthrightly disconfirmed (God does not act as the theist ex
pects, as when the prospective medical student fails the entrance
exams) or they are neither confirmed nor disconfirmed (at least
immediately-perhaps God makes the student wait for years to
take the exams) . In fact, the mature believer would say that such
beliefs ought to be held with a great deal of tentativeness, if th�y
are held at all.
This does not mean that one could never receive confirmation of
this type,5 and many theists do take events in their lives as confir
mation that God exists or that he wants them to do one thing
rather than another. Nevertheless, it points out a certain reluctance
on the part of theists "to put God to the test" or to be so pompous
as to think that they have this kind of access to the mind or will of
God. The central point is that, although one might receive confir
mation of these specific beliefs on occasion, theists are reluctant to
claim that such confirmation is readily available. The question to
be asked is why theists make such allowances. The lesson to be
learned is that theists understand that God's actions toward us are
not always predictable, at least not in the same manner as natural
phenomena. For all the importance of predictive confirmation in
realms dealing with physical objects, it is clearly not as important
to theists or to the practice by which they form beliefs about God.
In short, basic practices can give us different, internal accounts of
what confirmation should look like, and to apply the standards
internal to one kind of practice to another is simply to apply an
irrelevant standard. Perhaps, then, we should look for another
kind of confirmation for theistic beliefs.
3.

Nonpredictive Confirmation

I turn now to explore two examples, one theistic and one deal
ing with a human person. My purpose is twofold. I note both
5. As already noted, however, a great deal of such confirmation might tend to
show the theistic belief practice unreliable. Still, one could receive such confirma
tion on occasion without it affecting one's judgment of the practice's reliability.
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differences and similarities between the two kinds of examples in
terms of confirmation and epistemic justification. I also provide
further grounds for my Alstonian observation that, although the
theist might know what would confirm her theistic beliefs, she
does not know when or if the confirmation will occur. The main
implication of this observation is that there is a kind of nonpredic
tive confirmation that, given the framework of basic practices de
veloped by Alston, is exactly what one should expect given the
nature of beliefs about individual persons and God.
Grigg gives an example of a theistic belief that is unconfirmed,
at least in terms of predictive confirmation: God created the world.
How might one approach confirmation of such a belief? It cannot
be done through predictive means, for the object of the belief
God-is not predictable. So, for what kinds of things should one
look? Two possibilities suggest themselves. First, it might be
enough for the provision of confirmation if there were some non
theistic event or fact to which one has epistemic access; that is, it
might be enough to confirm the belief that God created the world
if we can discover some ordinary, nontheistic fact about the world.
If this is enough, then one could have confirmation via a nontheis
tic belief-forming practice such as one of the paradigm practices
perception, for example. Take the mere existence of the world.
After all, if God created the world, then the world must exist. And
surely we can discover that the world exists. The second possibility
is that we need some other theistic belief to provide confirmation.
If this is the case, perhaps the practice through which one forms
theistic beliefs must come into play. This, and thus that nonpredic
tive confirmation for theistic beliefs is a possibility, is what I argue
here.
Return now to the first alternative. It perhaps provides some
kind of confirmation. It seems, however, that if confirmation of
theistic beliefs occurs through a nontheistic practice, the confirma
tion provided is very weak. Consider this analogy. Suppose it is
suggested that the belief "Kirsten created this sculpture" is con
firmed by the fact that this sculpture exists. Now, although it is
surely true that the creation of something entails the entity's exis
tence (or at least entails that the thing exists for some time), the
entity's existence seems to do little to confirm the belief needing
confirmation. It is best described as a fact that is necessary to the
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confirmation but not sufficient for confirmation. Thus, although
the sculpture's existence can immediately be inferred from
Kirsten's creating it, the discovery of the sculpture does little to
ward confirming that Kirsten created the sculpture. The same
seems to be true in the theistic case. If the existence of the sculpture
were enough to provide confirmation for the belief that Kirsten
created the sculpture, then the analogous theistic belief about God's
having created the world would be confirmed by the existence of
the world. But in neither case does the mere existence of the entoity
in question confirm one's beliefs about its creator. What seems to
be needed is an experience of, or belief about, the world (or the
sculpture) that more strongly links it to its creator.
We can now turn to the second possibility for confirming theis
tic belief, in which another theistic belief is needed for the confir
mation. Here I appeal, once again, to Alston's notion of a basic
practice. Continuing with the sculpture analogy, what is needed to
confirm that Kirsten created the sculpture is some information
about the sculpture that more strongly links this sculpture to
Kirsten's creative touch. What could this link be?
Although many suggestions could be made, perhaps we can di
vide the various options into three types. First, there could be
some sort of uniquely identifying features of the sculpture that al
low one to judge that it is indeed Kirsten's creation. One could be
an expert on Kirsten's style, for example, and be able to recognize
this piece as being in her style. Second, one could rely on the au
thority of someone who knows that this sculpture is Kirsten's cre
ation; perhaps an expert testifies to the claim or perhaps one is told
by a friend that this sculpture comes from Kirsten's creative hand.
Finally, perhaps the creator herself informs you that the sculpture
comes from her hand; maybe Kirsten simply tells you that she
made it. All these link this sculpture to Kirsten.
Some observations about the sculpture example can provide in
sight into the possibility of nonpredictive confirmation of theistic
beliefs. Parallel to the sculpture case, there seem to be three possi
ble means of linking the theistic belief to be confirmed with the
world created. First, one may be an expert on God's "style" and
thus be able to recognize the world as being in that style. Second,
one may be told (perhaps by one's parents or one's religious com
munity) that the world was created by God. Third, one may be
told by God that he created the world.
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What do we learn from these three parallel pairs of possibilities?
First, on the assumption that I am an expert and that I am paying
attention and trying to see whether this sculpture did indeed come
from Kirsten, I should be able to find features that (more or less)
uniquely identify this sculpture as Kirsten's creation. But note that
at some point I have to learn that this style is Kirsten's style. There
is nothing at the phenomenological level that allows me to identify
this object as the unique one that is the center of my concern. Nor
is there anything that uniquely connects the object to another indi
vidual qua that unique being. To return to the language developed
earlier, one simply cannot develop conceptual-reading beliefs about
such situations. There is always information in the background
somewhere that has significant content about the individuals in
volved. This information is held in the form of beliefs; more than
just a conceptual scheme is needed. Thus, one does not link the
unique features of some object to a unique person without at some
point learning about the intimate connections between the two;
and what is learned has substantial belief content. So it is with
God's creative work, or at least one might suspect. One cannot
know that this world was created by God through unique features
of the world unless one follows through with a learning process
that moves beyond a conceptual-reading level.
The comparison indicates some disanalogies as well. There are
two. First, what is the significance of "being an expert"? Are there
any experts when it comes to recognizing God-touched features of
the world?6 But a more important disanalogy is that there appear to
be no uniquely identifying features of the world that link its cre
ation and God's creative touch. Unless one claims that the world's
apparent design is sufficient to conclude Christian theistic creation,
I see little promise here. So, although there are some interesting
parallels between the Kirsten case and the case of God in terms of
where one might look for confirmation (both involve background
content beliefs), there is an important difference in that when it
comes to God's creation of the world there appear to be no unique
features of the world that can be attributed only to God (or least
none to which we have epistemic access) . Why the God and Father
of Jesus Christ, for example, instead of Krishna?
6. It might be interesting here to look closely at how difficult it is to become an
art expert and the interesting phenomena surrounding forgeries in the art world.

I
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I suggest that in fact this disanalogy teaches us something im
portant about CP. I have already noted (Chapter 8, Section I ) that
CP needs Christian* beliefs to generate religious beliefs with spe
cifically Christian content. I argued that these background beliefs
need justification. Where are they to be found? My argument is
that such a demand leads to either an infinite regress ofjustification
or natural theology (or other inferential reasoning) with a Christian
result. Neither of these is felicitous for the Reformed epistemolo
gists. But there is another possibility that I considered briefly
(Chapter 7, Section 6): a theistic, nonlawlike externalism.
This kind of externalism is not lawlike in that its working in us
is not natural (in a sense that allows for predictive possibilities) but
supernatural. It depends on God's inclining himself toward us and
not on some lawlike mechanism. It is rather like the reliabilism
Alston rejects in arguing that justification is not simply reliability
but has, rather, a reliability constraint. He says that it may be that
accurate weather predictions simply pop into my head-but I have
no access to their source even though they are reliable. Rather like
that, perhaps God simply pops things into the theist's head. Let us
call this "theistic reliabilism. " But would this reliable source of be
lief provide the kind ofjustification required for Christian* beliefs?
Certainly not on Alston's account of justification, for theistic re
liabilism has no internal access as Alston requires. What about ac
cording to Plantinga's view? Insofar as one is impelled to believe
these God-inspired beliefs (and one has met whatever normative
requirements there are), they would meet Plantinga's criteria for
justification or proper basicality. But that is just to raise an impor
tant question about the extraordinarily weak notion ofjustification
in which Plantinga's account of proper basicality is embedded.
Why should we take such beliefs to be justified, even prima facie?
Alston seems to have the happier account ofjustification here, and
once again, the theistic reliabilism I have suggested does not spec
ify an internalist constraint.
Why not add one? The answer is that, unlike other reliable prac
tices in which one can return again to the practice for "retesting, " it
is not clear that one can do so with CP. The account of God pro
vided by CP is one of a deity who hides himself. One can have a
religious experience and never have another by which to test the
first. At least with the human case-Kirsten and her sculpture-
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one can check the features of Kirsten's style, or check with Kirsten
herself, or ask other experts. In the religious case, can these other
approaches be used to check earlier experiences? Perhaps, but an
other problem arises here.
Recall my distinction between CP and religious practice. Al
though it is true that many, if not most, Christian believers have a
large number of religious experiences, they must learn to take
these as Christian experiences since nothing in the phenomenon of
the experience is explicitly Christian. What is the source of the
Christian content? This brings us to the second possibility noted
above, my being told by my parents that God created the world. Is
this really parallel to my being told by a friend that this is Kirsten's
sculpture? In the case of the sculpture there are other means of
checking the story. I can appeal to features of the sculpture that
pick it out as Kirsten's or I can ask Kirsten. 7 Can I ask God? Per
haps, but asking does not imply receiving a reply. Of course, the
same is true for Kirsten; she does not have to grace us with a reply
either. And here we learn something of value. The access we have
to information about persons qua unique individuals depends in an
important way on the self-revelation of the person involved or on
information given to us by others. Let me expand on this.
Just as I must learn from someone to take the markings on the
sculpture to be in Kirsten's style, thus connecting this sculpture to
Kirsten, so I must learn to take religious experiences to be Chris
tian. Where do we learn such things? Barring prophets and the
founder of Christianity, we learn the set of Christian beliefs, sym
bols, and concepts from our parents, the broader Christian com
munity, and, more generally, the entire tradition-its history,
myths, and scriptures. Here what Reid calls-and the Reformed
epistemologists call attention to-the "credulity disposition" is im
portant. We all have a natural disposition to trust what others tell
us. This disposition is modified as we mature as epistemic agents.
We learn not to trust certain people, or not to trust them on certain
issues. This disposition, I suggest, is important in the formation of
Christian beliefs (as well as those of competing traditions such as
7· The former approach seems ruled out in the God case, for there may be no
unique features to which I can appeal as evidence that this world was indeed cre
ated by God.
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Buddhism or Hinduism). In fact for most of us-once again bar
ring prophets and religious visionaries-this is the sole source of
our Christian framework of beliefs and concepts. But one of the
things we learn as we mature epistemically is that, although much
of what we learn through the credulity disposition is true, when it
is crucial we should check the claims of others ourselves.
Is it crucial to do so for the Christian tradition? It appears so, for
the tradition is in competition with others as it claims exclusive
truth for its central beliefs. And unlike other epistemic practices
that are conceptual-reading practices, CP is not-it is completely
self-contained in its belief content. By "completely self-contained" I
mean that, for those in the tradition whose sole source of that be
lief content is the authority of others, we must either find some
means of checking our employment of the credulity disposition or
recognize the rather radical circularity of our Christian worldview.
The former seems unlikely, for the only people who seem to have
access to Christian truth by some means other than the word of
other Christiaas are the prophets and founders. This brings us to
the third possibility suggested above, that I am, or some human is,
told by God that he created the world. But just how would God
communicate such a thing? Scripture tells us, but that is little if any
better than being told by a friend. And prophets are the source of
Scripture. Furthermore, information we have about the prophets is
largely internal to the tradition, its scriptures, and its authority;
once again we must rely on the credulity disposition. Even if we
could ask Jesus himself-and what better source than him to ask
if he is the Son of God, would we not have to take his word for it?
Not even his miracles take us from this-worldly events to theo
logically laden beliefs. Although they are certainly surprising, all
historical research can give us that they happened. What history
does not give us is why they happened, and in particular that they
happened at the hand of God. So this route seems unpromising
unless, perhaps, one wants to return to natural theology. But even
here it seems that we cannot get explicitly Christian results but at
best only a rather generic theism.
What of the other option-recognizing the rather radical circu
larity of the Christian world view? This is the position I believe we
should take, but not without noting the fact that such circularity
has been thought by many to provide justification for the beliefs
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the circle contains. This is a holistic kind ofjustification, or a t least
a justification with a strong holistic component. This should not, I
think, be a surprise, for when I presented the account of exagger
ated CP above I in effect greatly loosened the justificatory connec
tion between the experiences that are the occasion for the genera
tion of theistic beliefs and the resulting theistic beliefs. This is an
important claim of the holist: experience is the genesis of belief but
is not needed for justification. This distancing ofjustification from
experience is no less true for CP. Although there is a religious
experience at the bottom of CP, the generation and justification of
the explicitly Christian reading of that experience depends wholly
on other Christian beliefs. I have more to say on this below.
Now, this all seems parallel to cases of linking individual hu
mans to their activities. It seems clear enough that the belief or
experience needed for confirming that Kirsten created the sculpture
is one that makes reference to Kirsten. It is not sufficient to know
some "bare" fact about the sculpture, that is, a fact that stands free
of some attribution of Kirsten's activity or even, for that matter,
the fact that some person created it. So it seems with the belief that
God created the world. If the world's existence is to be understood
to confirm the belief that God created the world, there must be
some information that links the world to God besides the original
belief. There must be some means of access to further theistic data
for the confirmation of theistic beliefs to occur. And this is, I sug
gest, just where the holist justification, with its reliance on the cre
dulity disposition, comes into play.
The theist may be quite willing to suggest that she does have
access to further theistic data. The theist may receive confirmation,
on occasion, that God created the world. The predictive confirma
tion challenger can point out, however, that this access fails to
have an important feature. The access to theistic data needed for
confirmation does not, unlike the access to ordinary perceptual ob
jects, allow for predictive confirmation. Why? Because whatever ac
cess one has to the needed information-information that has a
theistic component-relies on God's revealing himself or his activ
ity. When trying to confirm that it is the desk in my office that had
ink spilled on it, I can put myself (typically) in a position to con
firm it by looking (again) to see if the ink stain is still there. But I
cannot put myself in a position for God to speak to me and be in
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the least guaranteed that he will. Although one can predict what
event would confirm a theistic belief (e. g. , God's telling us he did
something), one cannot predict the occurrence of the event. Its oc
currence relies on God's action, to which we have no predictive
access. In summary, with perceptual beliefs and PP there appear to
be (under many if not most circumstances) means by which we can
predict the occurrence of happenings or events that would confirm
the belief in question. Although sometimes these predictions fail,
generally they do not. We believe this because the predictions" rely
on a certain understanding of the physical world and the epistemic
practice through which we have access to that world. This under
standing is internal to the set of beliefs we have about the world,
the experiences we have of the world, and the practice through
which these two are connected. Furthermore, the perceptual epi
stemic practice can become internally validated through repeated
confirmations, allowing us generally to trust the practice as reli
able. With theistic beliefs the case is different. We can say what
(theistic) facts or events might provide confirmation, but we can
not say ahead of time when (or even if) we will have access to
them; we cannot predict their occurrence. I suggest that the prac
tices through which we have access to God, through which we
form theistic beliefs, do not give an understanding of God that
provides for predictive confirmation-and that is precisely as it
should be. The same is true, however, for belief-forming practices
that provide us with beliefs about epistemically unique, spatiotem
porally nonrooted individuals, especially those with free will.
There is no epistemic access to such individuals apart from the
practice that generates beliefs about them. One must always turn
to the same practice (or subpractices) to confirm the belief in ques
tion. And with these practices there is no predictive element. The
objects of the beliefs are unpredictable, just as God is.
To complete the discussion of our examples, one further issue
needs consideration. There is a sense in which any person holding
the belief "God created the world" has access to the information
needed to confirm theistic beliefs. For example, it follows imme
diately from the fact that God is the creator-sustainer of the world
that God created the flowers, the hills, the trees. It might be sug
gested that these (theistic) beliefs provide the needed confirmation.
I believe this suggestion does not suffice, for this "access" is not
really access and therefore does not provide an interesting kind of
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confirmation. Grigg speaks of the confirmation being "outside. "
Although it is less than fully clear what Grigg means by outside
confirmation, it surely should not include confirmation by beliefs
whose truth is known simply by an immediate, one-step inference
from the belief needing confirmation.
The problem can be seen by exploring the following case. Con
sider meteorologist Smith who, after research, forms the belief p
that sundogs can be seen whenever conditions C are met. As she
continues her research, Smith discovers that conditions C are, in
fact, about to occur. To confirm her belief, she predicts that at
time t and location 1 a sundog will appear. Those conditions come
about, the sundog appears, and Smith has confirmation of p. Now
Smith holds the belief that sundogs appear under certain condi
tions. Were she merely to infer that a sundog did in fact appear
under those conditions, without the corresponding experience, she
would not have truly confirmed her belie£ Armchair science is ruled
out. Likewise, without some further data beyond the theistic belief
"God created the world, " confirmation seems unlikely. The confirm
ing information must be generated from an "outside" source.
This raises the important issue: what exactly is the appropriate
sense of "outside"? I do not think I can provide a full answer to this
question. Two things can be noted, however. First, I have already
suggested that to be outside is to extend beyond immediate infer
ences from the belief to be confirmed, beyond what can be done in
the armchair. Second, in some ways confirmation is always "in
side. " This is where Alston's notion of basic practices, the notion
of epistemically circular reasons, Alston's larger doxastic practice
approach to epistemology, and the possibility of holistic justifica
tion come into play. The sculpture analogy is a case in point. What
confirms the belief that Kirsten created the sculpture is an aware
ness of a further fact connecting the sculpture to Kirsten's creative
work. The information needed for confirmation must make refer
ence to or contain at least some of the members of the very set of
notions contained in the belief being confirmed. A belief about
Kirsten must be confirmed by some further information about
Kirsten; a belief about God must be confirmed by further informa
tion about God. 8
8. It is not clear that one can draw a hard and fast conclusion on this point. For
example, the confirmation in the breakfast case does not directly rely on the notion
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A somewhat different although related point is that I have access
to this connecting information by Kirsten telling me, someone else
telling me, or some feature "telling" me that Kirsten did indeed
make the sculpture. The source of the confirming data is, presuma
bly, the same source as (or a source closely allied with) the source
from which I derived my original belief. Otherwise the content of
the data is not likely to be immediately related. It seems true that
there are only a limited number of means through which one has
access to the needed information and also true that certain kinds of
information can be discovered only by certain kinds of approach.
This is in part the point of Alston's suggestion that beliefs about
physical objects are formed through a basic practice. My claim is
that I came to hold the belief that Kirsten created the sculpture via
a belief-forming practice that relies on someone telling me
(whether Kirsten or someone else) or recognizing that the sculp
ture is one of Kirsten's and that any confirmation I come by is not
outside these practices (or closely related practices) and their related
beliefs and experiences.
The lesson I wish to draw from these observations is that it ap
pears that confirmation is circular in two senses. First, confirma
tion seems to rely on the fact that the confirmation available for a
given belief must typically appeal to the epistemic practices and
related beliefs and experiences that formed the original belief need
ing confirmation. Thus, if there is a link between confirmation and
validation, one might begin to suspect that it is somewhat circular.
Such confirmation and validation are not "outside" in any absolute
sense. Second, confirmation is circular, since even how it should be
conceived is dependent on the practice and the nature of the objects
about which the practice provides us beliefs. For practices dealing
with regular predictive things, confirmation should be predictive.
For those not dealing with predictive things, confirmation should
not be predictive. Accordingly, if confirmation is to have an epi
stemic role, one should suspect that that role has a large holistic
component, especially where a noninferential mediated practice is
at stake.9
o f breakfast. I t does, however, seem to rely indirectly o n the notion: there i s one
less egg in the refrigerator because I ate it for breakfast.
9. A general note on this chapter. Alston makes the point, in Perceiving God, pp.
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